Efficiency of bolsa floresta program in the Brazilian amazon by Lucas, Nathalia
 
 
Master’s thesis  ·  30 hec  ·  Advanced level  
Environmental Economics and Management - Master’s Programme   
Degree thesis No 804  ·  ISSN 1401-4084  
                     Uppsala 2013 
 
 
Efficiency of Bolsa Floresta Program in 
the Brazilian Amazon 
 
Nathalia Lucas     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
iiiiiiii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Efficiency of Bolsa Floresta Program in the Brazilian Amazon 
Nathalia Lucas 
 
Supervisor: Ing-Marie Gren, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, 
 Department of Economics 
 
Examiner: Lars Drake, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, 
 Department of Economics 
 
 
Credits:  30 hec 
Level: A2E  
Course title: Independent project/degree in Economics E  
Course code: EX0537 
Programme/Education: Environmental Economics and Management,  
Master’s Programme 
Faculty: Faculty of Natural Resources and Agricultural Sciences 
 
Place of publication: Uppsala 
Year of publication: 2013 
Cover picture:, Mario Oliveira, Amazonastur 
Name of Series: Degree project/SLU, Department of Economics 
No: 804 
ISSN 1401-4084 
Online publication: http://stud.epsilon.slu.se 
 
Key words: Amazon, biodiversity, environmental services, environmental policy, forest, 
payment for environmental services. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii 
 
 
Abstract 
 
All over the world the increasing disappearance of natural habitats and ecosystems is 
concerning policy makers, populations and nongovernmental organizations. Many ecosystems 
such as forests are multifunctional landscapes and they provide a range of environmental 
services (benefits that people obtain from the ecosystem) that are vital for humankind and 
therefore worth preserving. Payment for environmental services (PES) has been applied 
increasingly in countries with high conservation concerns. PES is a monetary compensation 
scheme to “reward” environmental service providers for their actions in protecting the 
ecosystem.  Normally the compensation amount is a random value, based on budget 
restrictions rather than an accurate sum of social net benefits. This is the case for the biggest 
PES scheme in Brazil; the Bolsa Floresta program in the Brazilian Amazon forest where the 
local indigenous populations receive a fixed monthly amount for preserving the forest. The 
paid fixed monthly value of approximately 30USD may not reflect the true value an 
Amazonian ecosystem- therefore the purpose of this study.  
In a tropical rainforest context, as the Brazilian Amazon, the local population plays an 
important role when conservation is the final objective of an environmental policy. The 
decision making process requires an assessment of costs and benefits incurred by the local 
population. A compensation scheme is often proposed as a solution and part of conservation 
policy. To assess a fair compensation amount, the economic values associated with those 
services need to be calculated. Such values are calculated for biodiversity preservation, 
carbon services and foregone benefits of alternative land use. The selected assessment 
methodology is benefit transfer, which makes uses of the previously estimated costs and 
benefits drawn from other studies.  Benefit transfer uses economic information captured at a 
study site to make inferences about the economic value of environmental goods and services 
at a policy site. The biggest advantage of choosing benefit transfer is to reduce the need for 
costly and time-consuming original study for non market values. However the disadvantage 
of the method is the requirement for adjustment due to differences between the study and 
policy sites. The determinants of willingness to pay for an environmental good can greatly 
vary according to socio-economic and demographic characteristics. 
The optimal payment level is obtained by maximizing the society’s net welfare, when 
marginal values for producing both market and non market goods are equal. On the benefit 
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side, the values were based in previous studies estimates for biodiversity protection and 
carbon services values were taken from market estimations and international default values. 
On the cost side, the values were transferred from opportunity cost studies for alternative land 
use made by Brazilian authors. The choice of using benefit transfer gives access to a broad 
database but also makes inevitable some degree of imprecision and inaccuracy. The analysis 
of the studied costs and benefits shows that this PES scheme does not compensate opportunity 
costs and the optimal payment exceeds current payment schemes. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Global discussions about climate change have opened an alternative path to the 
conservation debate. The climate change issue seemed more urgent and demanding for a 
quick solution than any other environment problem did before. Because the effect of warming 
goes beyond national borders, international commitment is required in order to find a 
common solution. There is a constant seek for mechanisms to finance solutions and 
compensation schemes and therefore economics provides an important source of solutions 
and theoretical background. In that context, financial mechanisms drive the light of the debate 
toward natural resources abundant countries such as Brazil, which makes use of this 
privileged position to gather international support and build national initiatives for forest 
conservation. These initiatives are structured to compensate forest dependent communities for 
providing environmental services such as biodiversity and carbon sequestration. Projects 
related to avoided deforestation are not officially included in the international agreements of 
the Kyoto Protocol however there is a voluntary carbon market which includes this kind of 
initiative. The expectation is that future negotiations for a post-Kyoto commitment will 
include avoided deforestation projects.  
The Bolsa Floresta program, a scheme for payments for environmental services in the 
Brazilian state of Amazonas, has not yet been analyzed from an economic efficiency point of 
view. The purpose of this work is to evaluate the Payment for Environmental Service in the 
Bolsa Floresta Program. The analysis and discussion of the program’s efficiency will tell if 
the benefit received by the providers of the environmental service is optimal and to which 
extent the results justify the policy implementation. This work will discuss the program from 
an environmental policy perspective and analyze some of the costs and benefits to both 
beneficiaries and payers within the program.  
The limitation of this study is due to lack of reliable and up to date data. Selecting the 
Benefit Transfer approach which uses data from other studies instead of collecting own data 
represents the ‘second best’ option for a fairly reasonable comparison therefore increasing the 
risk of poor practice. The ideal scenario would contain assessment and proper data collection 
in the areas where the Bolsa Floresta program is active as well as an accurate investigation of 
the economic values of the Amazon forest. That was not the case for this work, data from 
similar studies were used to build the comparison and withdraw the conclusions. The studies 
selected to be part of this analysis had in some extent the same tropical forest context as the 
Brazilian Amazon. But the similarities are very limited.  
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The content of this work is unique mostly because it raises the discussion on the 
benefit side of this specific PES scheme in Brazil. Many studies have focused on the REDD 
initiatives and potential for PES  in tropical forest areas, but since the Bolsa Floresta is 
relatively new there are no special analysis or debate on the benefits received by local 
population. The concept of the program is aligned with the country’s policy of transferring 
income to the poor portion of the population. This type of policy highlights the social 
component and is doubtless, one powerful marketing tool to policy makers. On the other hand 
the benefit of preserving one of the world’s richest ecosystems such as the Amazon forest 
cannot just fit a social policy perspective. There is much more value in the Amazon Forest 
and this value should be assessed, discussed and taken into consideration when setting the 
amount of benefit to be paid in such schemes. 
This study is divided in five sections; first section provides a background on the 
Brazilian Amazon context and a brief overview of Bolsa Floresta. The theoretical background 
is presented in the second section, starting with PES theory and followed by the optimal 
design of payments. The third section introduces costs and benefits associated with the 
program and a description of data. An analysis on the actual payment scheme is introduced in 
the fourth section and the fifth section provides a comparison and discussion of actual and 
optimal payment schemes. 
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 2. Bolsa Floresta and Environmental Services  
 
This section is divided into three parts; first a background about the Brazilian Amazon 
context followed by introduction to the Bolsa Floresta program and environmental services 
definition. 
 
2.1 Background: Brazil and Amazon context 
 
Brazil is the owner of a large portion of world’s natural resources and is an 
internationally recognized player in the climate change negotiations, mostly due to the fact 
that more than 3.3 millions km2, almost 40% of its territory is the Amazon Tropical Forest. 
Nine Brazilian states are part of the so called Legal Amazon sharing the same biome 
characteristics and the Amazon basin. Part of the Legal Amazon region is the state of 
Amazonas which is the largest State in Brazil and holds the highest level of biodiversity, it 
has a surface area of 1,558,897.70 km2 and a vast portion of this region is occupied by 
floristic reserves and the remainder by water. Around 25% of the planet's fresh water reserves 
can be found in the State of Amazonas. This part of Brazil is considered a hotspot for 
biodiversity, carbon storage and other environmental services.  
The increasing global demand for feedstock and livestock is shifting the expansion of 
Brazilian agricultural frontier, towards the Amazon. As the demand for cultivation area 
increases, more pressure is directed to the region and small monoculture farms are created to 
cultivate different types of crops. Most of the time agricultural expansions occur in forest 
areas which are cleared to give space to crop production. Deforestation has been a national 
concern for more than three decades. According to the Brazilian Forest Code private land 
owners in the Legal Amazon area should preserve 80% of the forest, allowing cultivation only 
on the remaining area. To hinder the advancing of deforestation, protected areas have been 
created. Different types of protected areas can be found in the Amazon region: fully protected, 
sustainable use protected and indigenous land, the latter two corresponding to approximately 
35% of the biome.  
Recent climate change awareness has brought attention to the world’s forest regions as 
they are responsible for a wide range of environmental services to populations. Perman et al. 
(1996) classify forests as multi-functional when they provide timber, fuelwood, food, water 
for drinking and irrigation, stocks of genetic resources and other forest products. As 
ecosystems, forests also provide a wide variety of services, including removal of air pollution, 
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regulation of atmospheric quality, nutrient cycling, soil creation, habitats for humans and 
wildlife, watershed maintenance, recreational facilities and aesthetic and other amenities. 
The conservation of the Amazon forests is essential if one wants to secure opportunities to 
improve life conditions of the region’s indigenous, traditional and riverside populations. 
Viana (2008) argues that these populations depend on the forests for their livelihood and 
possess a wealth of etno-ecological knowledge about the forest, which should be a strategic 
component of poverty reduction efforts and attempts to improve their quality of life. 
 
2.2 Bolsa Floresta Program 
 
As a result from the acknowledgement that the Amazonas state can have an important 
role in climate change mitigation, the Amazonas government elaborated, in 2007, the first 
state law in Brazil concerning climate change, environmental conservation and sustainable 
development. The law recognizes the importance of forest conservation as an instrument to 
combat climate change and bring sustainable development to local communities.  The state 
law institutes on its fifth article the creation of the Bolsa Floresta (Forest Allowance) program 
with its multiple components: income, social, family and association. The Bolsa Floresta 
Program is the first Brazilian internationally certified initiative to reward traditional and 
indigenous populations for the protection of the environmental services provided by the 
tropical forests. The goal of the program is to institute the payment for environmental services 
and products provided by the traditional communities in favor of the sustainable use of natural 
resources, conservation, environmental protection and the incentive for voluntary policies for 
reducing deforestation.  
To better understand the program context, a more in deep analysis must be conducted 
concerning the main features of the conservation units. These protected areas comprise a 
special administrative regime that aims to ensure full protection of natural resources and 
biodiversity. Since year 2000 a national system of conservation units has been implemented. 
It divides the protected areas in distinct categories, the two main groups being: fully protected 
and sustainable use. In the fully protected area the main objective is to preserve the nature and 
only the indirect use of its natural resources is allowed. In the sustainable use area the 
objective is to balance nature conservancy and the sustainable use of natural resources. The 
traditional populations living in this area have special concessions to reside in. Although they 
are not holders of any land tenure the special concession allows them to extract natural 
resources from the area as long as they apply sustainable management practices. They are also 
allowed to produce agricultural goods in small scale for subsistence needs. 
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 By environmental services one can understand benefits provided by the standing 
forests, such as climate stability, rain maintenance, carbon storage in the trees and 
biodiversity conservation. The primary objective is to support traditional communities living 
inside state conservation units (UCs) and obtain their commitment to the zero deforestation 
target of the Amazonas state. The payments for environmental services are made directly to 
the communities who dwell at the UCs in Amazonas. It has as goal the reduction of carbon 
emissions originated from deforestation. The monitoring is made at two fronts: deforestation 
and field. The monitoring of deforestation is conducted annually inside the reserve through 
satellite images which are analyzed by partnering institutions. The field monitoring is 
performed in partnership among FAS (Sustainable Amazon Foundation), Environment and 
Sustainable Development Secretariat of Amazonas, State Center for Units Conservation, State 
Center for Climate Changes, SIPAM/SIVAM (FAS, 1, 2010). The following chapter will 
provide a deeper analysis of environmental services concepts and payments for this type of 
services. 
 
2.3 Environmental Services 
 
Environmental services are the benefits people obtain from the environment (Hanley 
and Barbier, 2009; Perman et al., 2003). In the literature this term brings together a variety of 
benefits, Hanley and Barbier (2009) categorize them into goods, services and cultural 
benefits. Table 1 shows different categories of environmental services, most of the times the 
PES schemes related to forest conservation can fit into more than one category. The services 
identified in Table 1 are, according to Wunder (2005), so far the only ones that exhibit 
significant commercial scale.  
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Table 1. Examples of Environmental Services in Tropical Forests                   
 Environmental 
Services Carbon  Biodiversity 
Watershed 
protection 
Scenic 
Beauty 
Examples 
Carbon 
capture in 
growing 
vegetation or 
carbon 
storage in 
soil and 
vegetation 
Ecosystem 
structure 
regulation, 
genetical 
diversity and 
of species 
Water 
purification, 
flow 
regulation and 
sedimentation 
Natural 
landscape 
Benefits paid for 
Potential 
effect of 
climate 
change 
mitigation  
Option value 
(future use) 
and 
existence 
value 
Water quality 
and 
availability 
Recreation 
and tourism 
 (Landell‑Mills and Porras, 2002)  
 
The targeted provision of water protection and carbon sequestration exists in a well-defined 
structure of coordination between the suppliers of these services and the demand for them. On 
the other hand, biodiversity conservation and scenic beauty remain public goods without a 
well-defined private demand, and without target payments (Biénabe and Hearne, 2006). 
To Bond et al. (2009) natural ecosystems continue to be degraded or lost at an 
alarming rate because benefits of environmental services are public goods and the cost of 
ensuring their provision often falls on local land managers. As land is usually managed for 
private benefit, it is generally more attractive for land managers to convert their land to 
alternative uses such as agriculture rather than maintain it in its natural state (Ibid). 
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3. Optimal PES Theory 
 
The theory section is divided into three parts; first a brief discussion on environmental 
services is provided, followed by payment for environmental services theory and optimal 
policy design of PES scheme. 
 
3.1 Payment for Environmental services 
 
The disappearance of natural habitats and species is directly associated to human 
action, imposing a threat to environmental services provision. Wunder (2005) argues that this 
emerging scarcity makes ES potentially subject to trade. The core idea of payments for 
environmental services (PES) is that external ES beneficiaries make direct, contractual and 
conditional payments to local landholders and users in return for adopting practices that 
secure ecosystem conservation and restoration (Wunder, 2005).  A now commonly accepted 
definition of PES contains these elements (Wunder, 2007): 
• A voluntary transaction 
• A well-defined environmental service or a land use likely to secure its provision 
• At least one buyer 
• At least one provider effectively controlling service provision 
• If and only if the environmental service provider secures service provision (conditionality) 
 
PES is a tool used to address those specific problems in which ecosystems are 
mismanaged because many of their benefits are externalities from the perspective of 
ecosystem managers (Engel, 2008). PES is not based on the polluter-pays principle but on the 
beneficiary-pays principle, and as such is attractive in settings where ES providers are poor, 
marginalized landholders or powerful groups of actors. An important distinction within PES 
is between user-financed PES in which the buyers are the users of the ES, and government-
financed PES in which the buyer is typically the government, acting on behalf of ES users. In 
practice, PES programs differ in the type and scale of demand, the payment source, the type 
of activity, the performance measure used, as well as the payment mode and amount (Ibid). 
The effectiveness and efficiency of PES depends significantly on program design. PES are 
used as an important mechanism to translate external, non-market values of the environment 
into real economic incentives for local actors to provide such services. The Brazilian initiative 
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is designed for Amazon‘s traditional population in an important attempt to keep these 
population attached to the land they naturally belong to. It is a government-financed scheme 
but with private investment from other partners complementing the total budget.  
Börner et al. (2009) argues that a major economic precondition for PES is that the 
beneficiaries' willingness to pay exceeds providers' willingness to accept.  The value of the 
service(s) at hand (determining the environmental service user’s willingness-to-pay [WTP] 
for PES) must at least exceed provider's opportunity costs determined by profits foregone 
from abandoning their first best land-use plan (determining the environmental service 
provider’s willingness-to-accept [WTA] PES, plus transaction costs [TC]) (Ibid). Wunder 
(2008) stresses that in some situations, profits from alternative land uses may be too high for 
conservation to compete or transaction costs are prohibitive for PES.  PES only makes 
environmental sense when it can increase service provision relative to a business-as-usual 
scenario. Börner (2009) remarks the need for establishing a set of economic and institutional 
preconditions for PES to become a feasible and cost-effective conservation mechanism in the 
Brazilian Amazon.  
When comparing PES schemes with other environmental policy instruments many 
problems and several advantages arise. Subsidies schemes can suffer from lack of 
additionality, paying for activities that would have been conducted anyway. Another problem 
is leakage when environmental-damaging activities can be shifted to other places. Both 
problems are less likely to happen in a tax scheme, for example. 
 A main difference between command-and-control and PES schemes is that for 
example, forestry conservation would apply to all forests, not differing with respect to the 
level of benefits they provide, or to the cost of conserving them (Engel, 2008). On the other 
hand, a PES approach is more flexible benefiting forest areas of higher value and lower cost. 
For example, a PES approach with a fixed per hectare payment for forest conserved would 
induce landholders with relatively higher marginal costs of conservation to conserve less 
forest land than those with lower costs. If a hectare of forest conserved provides the same 
level of ES everywhere, such a solution would be more cost-efficient than regulating each 
landholder to conserve the same amount (Ibid). 
Weak governance, imperfect information and high transaction costs are some of the 
problems associated with the design of command and control instruments in developing 
countries with respect to enforcement and monitoring according to Engel (2008). Equity 
issues and income distribution can be a result of command-and-control regulations. Many 
poor communities depend on forests for their livelihoods, and therefore a PES scheme that 
 9 
 
imposes restrictions on the use of forest resources can create economic drawback and may 
induce social conflicts. The main objective of PES programs is to make privately unprofitable 
but socially-desirable practices become profitable to individual land users, thus leading them 
to adoption of sustainable practises (Ibid). To Vatn (2009) PES may offer a fair and efficient 
way to deal with immensely growing interconnections. As they become more and more 
global, payments are a way to simplify necessary transfers as more groups can be directly 
involved in solving problems whose origin or solution may lie far away (Ibid). 
 
3.2 Policy Design of PES 
 
As multifunctional landscape forests produce both market and non-market goods. The 
non-market goods are public goods, which are non-rival and non-exclusive and therefore a 
lack of payment for those services results in underinvestment in the protection, management 
and establishment of forests (Landell‑Mills and Porras, 2002). Moreover the existence of non-
market ecosystem services incurs a need for governmental intervention to tackle the market 
failure.  
Efficient policy design in a landscape context generally implies a combination of 
charges on polluting activities and compensation payments for land-uses providing public 
goods (Gren et al., 2010). A policy design model, from Gren et al. (2010), will be used to first 
identify conditions for second best policy design for different ecosystem services. The same 
model will be adopted for this work. Assuming the landscape area is Nl ecosystems where 
l=1…m different ecosystem. Each component provides market and non-market goods for final 
consumption Yil   where i=1…h goods, market goods such as meat and soybeans and non-
market goods such as biodiversity and carbon services. A unit value of pi is determined by the 
market value of the good. To the case of non-market goods the unit value is determined by the 
society’s appreciation.   
An efficient calculation for total net values in this case implies reliable data 
concerning the production function, Yil for both market and non-market outputs, and complete 
information on cost function Cil for producing each output. The production functions and 
costs functions associated with market goods can be defined clearly. Unit values for market 
good are also rather simple to obtain. However for non-market goods it is less 
straightforward. A demand function that reflects society’s appreciation for environmental 
goods is needed. The unit price of non-market goods is complex and difficult to obtain. 
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Baumol and Oates (1975) stress that economists have been aware of the enormous amount of 
information necessary to achieve anything that can even pretend to be close to optimality by 
means of centralized calculations. There are different techniques for valuing environmental 
goods and for this reason estimations have to be observed and interpreted carefully.  
The efficient policy design is society’s maximum net welfare, W, considering efficient 
allocation of market and non-market goods. With restriction to total landscape area available, 
N 
 
Max 𝑊 = ∑ ∑ p𝑖.𝑖𝑙  Yil  (Nil ) - Cil(Nil )    s.t  ∑ ∑𝑖𝑙 Nil≤ N                                                  (1) 
 
The first order conditions with respect to optimal choices of Nil are:  
 
∑ ∑𝑗𝑙  p
i .YilNil  - CilNil  -β = 0 for all i=1,…,h                                                                      (2) 
 
Land-uses are optimally allocated when their marginal net benefits are equal and correspond 
to β.  This Lagrangian multiplier provides a measure of how changes in the restriction (total 
land) would affect the production function. A positive shadow price, β, for example, indicates 
that expansion in land use increases society net welfare. On the other hand a low value of the 
shadow price, β, indicates that there is not much to be gained by relaxing the constraint. To 
identify optimal policies it is necessary to distinguish market Ym and non-market goods, Yn.  
The condition is expressed as follow: 
 
pm YmlNm l +  ∑ ∑𝑛𝑙  pn Ynl Nml - CmlNml = ∑ 𝑙 ( ∑𝑛 pnYnl Nnl + ∑𝑚 pmYmlNnl ) – CnlNnl     (3) 
 
Partial derivatives are denoted by the subscripts. The left hand side of (3) expresss the net 
value of marginal product from market goods. To calculate the net value from market goods, 
reliable information about production function and costs is needed, to accurately evaluate net 
profits from the activity alternative to conservation. It is composed of 3 parts: the value of a 
market good, pm YmlNm l , the sum of values of non market goods from all types of ecosystems, 
∑ ∑𝑛𝑙  pn Ynl Nml  and the marginal production cost of market good m in ecosystem l , CmlNml. 
The second term at the left hand side of (3) can be positive or negative, for example if we 
consider that the market activity will cut down all forest, carbon storage will be lost therefore 
it will be negative. By producing soya crops the net difference between the carbon stored and 
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the carbon sequestered in the growing crop might result in a negative value. An opposing 
example can be seen with scenic beauty as an environmental benefit, if society appreciate 
growing crops more than a tropical forest then a positive value will be given to the second 
term. Right hand side of (3) expresses the net value of marginal product obtained from non 
market goods. Again we need a production function and the costs associated with the 
provision of environmental benefit preserved. The net value on the right hand side is 
composed by the effects on the sum of the values of providing both non-market and market 
goods, ∑ 𝑙 ( ∑𝑛 pnYnl Nnl + ∑𝑚  pmYmlNnl ), and the marginal production cost of non 
market good n in ecosystem type l, CnlNnl .   
This model assumes that, unless a subsidy/charge is imposed on ecosystem service n 
and pn exists, the land owner makes decisions based on market prices of inputs and outputs. 
The efficient use of landscape is possible only after a charges or subsidies scheme is 
introduced, a charge for negative pn and a subsidy for positive pn. The land owner maximizes 
net benefits when marginal net benefits of different land uses are equal. If there is no 
compensation for producing non-market goods, nil pn, there is no incentive to produce non-
market goods, and all land is therefore devoted to produce solely market goods. When making 
decisions about efficient subsidy in non-market goods policy some criteria have to be 
considered such as low marginal provision cost and high unit value of market and non market 
goods. Condition (3) for optimal allocation and associated design of PES are illustrated in 
Figure 3.2 
 
Figure 3.2 Allocation of market and non market goods 
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An optimal level of payment is observed when net values of marginal products are 
equal for both market and non-market goods. The Lagrange multiplier, β is the optimal net 
value of marginal product, and N* the optimal allocation of land between the two options. In 
the graphic above the big triangle area abcd represents the profits obtained by the landowner 
when total land is devoted only to production of market goods. The area ef represents the 
opportunity cost for the landowner for not entering the conservation program, the foregone 
net benefit from the program payment. On the other hand, the area cdef represents the gains 
when all land is devoted to preservation.  
Ideally to calculate the optimal net value of landscape production, from scratch, two 
steps are essential: quantify production functions for both market and non market output and 
then associate monetary values with both types of outputs. Any accurate estimation demands 
an extensive set of data. For market output we would need data on the two most significant 
land uses in the Amazon, soya crops and cattle ranching, production function and market unit 
values of each output. Data concerning land use and projection of crop expansion would be 
also needed. For the non-market good we would need biodiversity and carbon storage 
production functions. The unit value used is obtained by the society’s appreciation of 
biodiversity. The unit value of carbon storage is taken from the unregulated market of carbon 
credits and content of carbon per hectare is needed to calculate direct benefits from standing 
forest.  
Instead of undergo sophisticated calculations and extensive data collecting this work 
will be using the above mentioned calculated values from other studies.  Knowing costs and 
benefits will allow the assessment of the net benefit (by subtracting costs from benefits) of 
optimal payments which will later be compared with actual payments. Based on the cost 
benefit analysis (CBA) theory, the aim is to find out what is the net benefits and if the value is 
positive or negative. A negative net benefit means there are no incentives to carry on a 
project, whereas e positive means there is incentive to go ahead with the project. The 
explanation according to Boardman (2006) is that positive net benefits make it possible, in the 
sense of making it available the resources to compensate those who bear the costs so that 
some people are made better off without making anyone else worse off. Willingness to pay 
and opportunity costs are the guiding principles for measuring costs and benefits (Ibid). 
CBA is one of the method used in decision making process, by assessing all cost and 
benefits incurred in a project scenario the resulting net benefit can indicate whether a project 
is feasible or not. It is specially used in public decision making when it concerns 
environmental regulations and development projects. It can be very useful in assessing the 
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feasibility of projects that affects society’s welfare in the present and can also prevent side 
effects and non-wanted costs to the future generations. 
The limitations of CBA is discussed in the literature, for example Boardman (2006) 
alerts that two types of circumstances make the net benefit criterion an inappropriate decision 
rule for public policy. First, technical limitations make it impossible to quantify and then 
monetize all relevant impacts as costs and benefits. Second, goals other than efficiency are 
relevant to the policy. Okamura (2004) investigates the flaws in CBA such as problems due to 
evaluating  non-economic values, limited considerations to distributional equity and political 
bias.  
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4. Description of Data  
 
In the previous chapter the theoretical background concerning PES was presented, 
now the data will be introduced. This section presents a discussion concerning benefits and 
costs from forest conservation. Due to available data constrains concerning the Amazon, most 
of the numbers employed in the calculations are drawn from other studies using the benefit 
transfer method. Therefore we start this chapter with a brief overview on the benefit transfer 
method. 
 
4.1 Benefit Transfers 
 
The benefit transfer method is relatively new in the literature. The method is used to 
estimate economic values for ecosystem services by transferring available information from 
studies already completed in another location and/or context (King and Mazzota, 2000). Thus, 
the basic goal of benefit transfer is to estimate benefits for one context by adapting an 
estimate of benefits from some other context.  Benefit transfer is often used when there are 
little resources available to conduct an original valuation study, yet some measure of benefits 
is needed (Ibid).  
Benefit transfer uses economic information captured at one place and time to make 
inferences about the economic value of environmental goods and services at another place and 
time. Using this approach, economic estimates are either transferred as monetary value units 
(e.g., means or medians) or as value functions conditioned on explanatory variables that 
define the attributes of an ecological and economic choice setting. King and Mazzota (2000) 
presents the method dividing in four basic steps: 1) To identify existing studies or values that 
can be used for the transfer. 2) To decide whether the existing values are transferable. 3) To 
evaluate the quality of studies to be transferred. 4) To adjust the existing values to better 
reflect the values for the site under consideration, using whatever information is available and 
relevant. 
The advantage of the method is that any reality can be adapted, developing countries 
with less resources, for example, can still conduct own accurate policy analyses by using 
values previously calculated by a wealthier country with more resources for research. Most of 
the original valuation studies available in the literature are related to high income countries 
and often is the case they are adopted by studies in low income countries. Step number four 
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from King and Mazzota (2000) is perhaps the most discussed aspect in benefit transfer theory 
as the values from an original study site are never a perfect match to the new study site, they 
need to be adjusted and this can be done in different ways.  
In Figeroa (2011) three different types of benefit transfer were presented: 
Unit Value type is the one used in this study for matter of simplicity. It consists in 
transferring the adjusted or not-adjusted unit value reported by the study site to the policy site. 
As the main advantage of this method is its simplicity, it has become one of the most used for 
policy analysis.  
Benefit Transfer Function (BFT) is an alternative method to the simple unit transfer 
value which does not consider specific information from the policy site. That consists of 
transferring the whole benefit function estimated in the original study site to the policy site 
instead of transferring only point values estimates from. 
 Meta-analysis is the type of benefit transfer that summarizes information from several 
valuation studies averaging their values expecting that this procedure will provide more 
accuracy than simple unit value transfer. 
Benefit transfer can also be used in different countries, Ready (2006) discuss benefit 
transfer usage across borders and argues that even when the good being valued is similar in 
two different countries there are still important issues to be taken into consideration in the 
analysis. International benefit transfer is mostly attractive both because of the potential cost 
savings as well as because of the ability to use consistent values in analyses of action that 
impact more than one country (Ibid). According to Ready and Navrud (2006) some of the 
issues that need to be addressed when using the BT method are related to currency 
conversion, difference in measurable attributes of the users and the measurement of wealth 
versus income.  
The currency conversion problem is due to the fact that identical individuals using 
different currencies will not have the same real WTP, unless they have the same real income 
and face the same real prices. The recommendation is thus, to use the purchasing power parity 
(PPP) adjusted exchange rate to convert values from one country to another. This adjusted 
exchange rate measures the amount of local currency in one country that would purchase the 
same amount of market goods as one unit of local currency in the other country. Adjustment 
according to PPP is as well supported by Figeroa (2011) that in addition recommends 
adjustment for inflation if the value from study site and the value to policy site differ in 
moments of time (Ibid). In this present study the specific biodiversity values were adjusted for 
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inflation considering the consumer price index however, were not adjusted for difference in 
income levels between study site and policy site.  
To Ready and Navrud (2006) the difference in the measurable attributes of the users 
can arise because the value of an environmental good is determined by three different sets of 
factors: the characteristics of the good itself (quantity, quality), the context within which the 
good exists (scarcity, availability of substitutes, etc.), and the characteristics of the users who 
value the good (income, age, experience).  In a contingent valuation method (CVM) survey 
sample, for example each individual give their responses based in a combination of factors 
such as experience, religion, education, utility, income, budget constraint, etc and these 
factors would probably vary between countries affecting the overall transferability of an 
economic value.  
Regarding the issue about difference measurement of wealth versus income happens 
because valuation surveys takes into consideration answers regarding respondent’s annual 
income and does not consider relevant budget constraint. Ready and Navrud (2006) concludes 
that annual income could serves as a reasonable proxy for wealth, only if this transfer is made 
within one country. Differences in income taxes for example between countries would affect 
the results in large extent and the solution proposed would be to subtract from the annual 
income reported in the survey  the average tax burden per country. 
 
4.2 Environmental Benefits  
 
Estimating the net social benefits of a policy requires estimates of the change in social 
surplus. A change in social surplus requires knowledge of the appropriate market demand and 
supply curves (Boardman, 2006).  Direct estimation of the demand curve is possible if we 
know at least one point on the demand curve, its functional form and either its slope or the 
price elasticity of demand. In many practical situations we do not know the slope or the price 
elasticity of demand (Ibid).  Where markets function well, analysts know at least one point on 
the demand and supply curves, represented by the observed intersection of market price and 
quantity exchanged, but still have to estimate these curves to measure either existing social 
surplus or changes in social surplus (Ibid). Where markets do not function well, which is the 
case of most environmental services market, special valuation methods are needed.    
When a market does not exist analysts try to obtain estimates of what the market price 
would be if the relevant goods were traded in a market where the demand curve measured 
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marginal social benefits and the supply curve measured social marginal costs. This estimate is 
called shadow price (Boardman, 2006). 
The economic field that attempts to connect environmental benefits with a monetary 
measure is relatively new and often contested in literature (i.e Perman, 1996; Pearce and 
Moran, 1994).  The values, known as environmental benefits are divided in two categories: 
use and non-use values. Use value arises from actual use or direct use such as input in 
production, indirect use such as flood control and nutrient cycles. Non-use values are more 
difficult to assess and are related to future uncertainty such as option value which is the 
attributed value to safeguard the asset for the option of using it in a future time and existence 
value that arises from the knowledge that the service exists and will continue to exist.  
The techniques to evaluate environmental goods are vast however only one method 
will be mentioned here. A very common method to assess environmental valuation is 
Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) which is a direct method that involves asking questions 
about WTP (i.e. for the deforestation not to occur) and WTA (i.e. compensation for 
biodiversity loss) to a sample of the relevant population. By using contingent valuation 
method we can get the theoretically correct monetary measures of utility change (Perman et 
al., 2003). One advantage of CVM is that it can deal with both use and non-use values, but 
there are also disadvantages associated with this method, such as overestimation of WTP and 
difficulty from respondents to answer the questions related to WTA.   
The range of benefits resulting from forest conservation is broad, for this work only 
biodiversity and carbon storage will be discussed. The existence of watershed protection and 
scenic beauty provision in the Amazon forest context is acknowledged, however. Although 
carbon cycle is complex the emphasis has been mostly on two points, here the analysis is 
narrowed to carbon storage and carbon sink. Similarly, biodiversity analysis will be quite 
simple.  
 
4.2.1 Biodiversity 
 
Biological diversity, or biodiversity, is defined by Pearce and Moran (1994) as the 
umbrella term used to describe number, variety and variability of living organisms in a given 
assemblage. In order to protect this valuable world resource the global community has agreed 
upon a Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) which is an international treaty for the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. The treaty was part of the 1992 Earth 
Summit in Rio. 
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The objectives of the Convention, are the conservation of biological 
diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, 
including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate 
transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account all rights over those 
resources and to technologies, and by appropriate funding (CBD, 1992).  
 
Aligned with this commitment, countries should promote local biodiversity protection 
and improve policies, laws and livelihoods of populations. The Brazilian government created 
a national commission to monitor and follow the objectives of CBD as well as develop 
cooperation in biotechnology and protection of national resources against bio-piracy. The 
creation and expansion of conservation units is also in accord with the commitment 
objectives. CBD classifies Brazil as one of the world’s 17 megadiverse countries, which 
incorporates 70% of the world’s catalogued animal and plant species. It is estimated that 
Brazil hosts between 15-20% of all the world’s biological diversity, and the greatest number 
of endemic species on a global scale (CBD,1, 2010). An important attempt is made here for 
the role of local communities and indigenous populations in preserving biodiversity which 
explains in part why should be monetarily compensated. The local communities and villages 
store significant knowledge of flora and fauna species, as well as the traditional management 
systems of these natural resources. The contribution of these communities is fundamental for 
the conservation and sustainable use of the genetic and biological resources of Brazil. The 
main threats to biodiversity are: fragmentation and loss of habitats, introduction of alien 
species and exotic illnesses, overexploitation of plants and animals, use of hybrids and 
monoculture in agro-industry and reforestation programs, pollution and climate change (CBD, 
2010). 
There are some obstacles in associating biodiversity with a monetary value: firstly 
biodiversity hotspots like the tropical forest are extremely diverse in number of species and 
genetic content and secondly those areas are often of remote access. A remarkable fact is that 
within one single hectare of Amazon forest 200-300 species of trees can be found (Verweij et 
al., 2009). For Mendonça et al (2003) the utility of biological diversity lies in several factors 
such as the maintenance of the integrity of an ecological system, esthetic distinctions, the 
option of the future discovery of a product among others. Therefore, when biodiversity is 
regarded from an economic standpoint, it must be defined with regard to these benefits (Ibid). 
Thus, the preservation price must represent the value of the contribution of the benefits 
coming from biodiversity which were produced by a change in the habitat for a single land 
unit (Ibid). 
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Preservation of biological diversity constitutes an environmental service for which 
beneficiaries around the world might be willing to pay. Benefits from the conservation are 
observed both locally and globally. Although the benefits are rather challenging to measure, 
Nijkamp (2008) concludes that it is generally accepted that biodiversity benefits cannot 
exclusively be expressed in numbers. Additionally the fact that it also depends on the 
ecological structure of a whole area makes it even more difficult to valuate accurately in 
monetary terms. Moreover, there is not a precise estimation of the biodiversity for the 
Amazon area; approximately half of the world’s biodiversity can be found within this tropical 
forest.  
The most common measure of biodiversity is the number of species in an area, and the 
primary concern about human effects on biodiversity is expressed in the loss of species 
(Huston and Marland, 2002). Nevertheless, for the purpose of simplicity in this study the 
biodiversity measure will consider not the number of species but people’s appreciation of 
biodiversity value. Two different studies were taken into account. Constanza et al. (1997) 
attributed the value of US$18 (biological control and genetical resources) to forest 
biodiversity service, per hectare per year. Biological control as trophic-dynamic regulations of 
populations  and genetic resources as sources of unique biological materials and products. In 
this study Constanza et al. (1997) attempts to estimate a global economic value for ecosystem 
services considering 17 ecosystem services for 16 biomes, the value per unit area of each 
ecosystem service for each ecosystem type. To estimate this ‘unit value’ for forest they used 
either: (1) the sum of consumer and producer surplus; or (2) the net rent (or producer surplus); 
or (3) price times quantity as a proxy for the economic value of the service (see appendix 3). 
Converting to 2010 prices (using consumer price index), US$ 26.43 is the benefit generated 
by biodiversity in forests. 
The second one, making use of willingness to pay, Cartwright (1985) estimated the 
benefit of biodiversity US$ 20 which corresponds to international appreciation for tropical 
forest preservation. The value suggested by Cartwright (1985) of US$ 20/ha/year represents 
what would be needed in order to convince tropical countries to enter into agreements for 
biodiversity conservation. Cartwright believes such a value is reasonable and Fearnside 
(1996) agrees this is a good starting point to discuss biodiversity conservation in Brazil. In 
2010 prices, we have US$40.45 value of biodiversity per hectare per year. For the 
biodiversity benefits case the two estimations above were considered. 
 
 
 20 
 
      Table 2. Biodiversity Benefits 
Biodiversity Benefits Min* Max** 
US$/ha/year 26.43 40.45 
                                           *2010 Values corrected from Constanza et al. (1997) 
                                           **2010 Values corrected from Cartwright (1985) 
 
4.2.2. Carbon Storage 
 
Climate change is driven by greenhouse gas (GHG) concentration in the atmosphere 
and by the rate of change of those concentrations through time (Perman et al., 2003). The 
extent of climate change depends on previous net emissions, in future GHG emissions and 
actions that affect carbon sinks. The main GHG, carbon dioxide, derives mainly from fossil 
fuels; however a big contribution of the emissions comes from deforestation. There are two 
main forms of carbon: organic (such as biomass of plants) and inorganic (CO2 in the 
atmosphere). Photosynthesis in plants turns organic carbon into inorganic carbon, which is 
either stored in biomass or turned back to its inorganic form (CO2) by decomposition or soil 
respiration. This CO2 can either return to the atmosphere or enter the rivers. Alternatively, it 
can react with soil minerals to form inorganic dissolved carbonates, which remain stored in 
the soils or wash out into the rivers (Verweij et al., 2009). 
Forests are an important storage of carbon, if cleared for agricultural production 
carbon will be released to the atmosphere. The carbon released contributes to greenhouse gas 
concentration. Pearce and Moran (1994) analyze two aspects in order to derive a value for 
carbon credits in a tropical forest context: 1) net carbon released when forest are converted to 
other uses, and 2) the economic value of one ton of carbon released to the atmosphere. Carbon 
will be released at different rates and depending on the method of clearance and posterior land 
use. It also takes into consideration the carbon content of biomass if land is converted to 
pasture or agriculture use.  
  According to Verweij et al. (2009) the potential value of sequestering or 
emitting carbon in the Amazon can be determined in two different ways: 1) the value can be 
derived from currently emerging international markets for trade in avoided carbon emissions 
2) investing in the conservation of carbon sinks in developing countries, which is 
economically more efficient than  avoidance of greenhouse gas emissions in developed 
countries and the international community is willing to pay to prevent such releases resulting 
from the conversion of rainforest.  
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Several researches suggest different estimations of carbon storage values. They mostly 
depend on the local characteristics of each forest type, which can widely differ across the 
Amazon region. In an attempt to reflect the local characteristics of this specific area of the 
Amazon, values from the conception document of Juma Reduced Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) were observed. This REDD project takes place 
in one of the 14 conservation units participating in the PES program. The document argues 
against     Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) default value for tropical forest 
of 131 tCO2/ha as it believes IPCC does not reflect all features of the area where the project is 
inserted. Hence values from Nogueira et al. (2008) with the estimation of 172.9 tCO2/ha to 
184.5 tCO2/ha were used to define the final values negotiated within the project. Final values 
vary from 156 tCO2 per hectare of alluvial forest and 161 tCO2 per hectare of dense forest. 
Until 2050 the REDD project will result in avoided emission of 189 million tCO2 and an 
equivalent protection of 329,483 hectares of tropical forest compared to the baseline scenario. 
REDD projects are already becoming part of conservation strategies and the development of 
this kind of projects is a financing source for the Amazonian PES. Pearce and Moran (1994) 
estimate the carbon released from deforestation of secondary and primary tropical forest to 
range from 100 to 200 tCO2/ha. However this study will adopt two values for carbon content: 
a conservative estimate of 110 tCO2/ha from Houghton et al. (2001) and the IPCC default 
value for tropical forest of 131 tCO2/ha as the maximum reference. The lower estimate was 
also adopted by Börner and Wunder (2008) to calculate opportunity cost estimations that will 
be presented in the next section. The calculated benefits range from carbon storage US$ 255.2 
to US$ 720.5 per hectare per year, as shown below in table 3. 
 
Table 3. Carbon Benefits 
    
Börner and 
Wunder 
Börner and 
Wunder 
Börner and 
Wunder Nepstad 
Carbon content  ton/ha 110 131 110 131 110 131 110 131 
Carbon price US$/tCO2 3.24 3.88 2.32 5.5 
Benefits US$/ha/yr 356.4 424.44 426.8 508.28 255.2 303.92 605 720.5 
 
4.2.3 Carbon sequestration 
 
Besides carbon storage the other relevant part is related to how much carbon can be 
absorbed from the atmosphere. IPCC defines carbon sequestration as an augment in carbon 
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stocks other than in the atmosphere (IPCC, 2000). The Kyoto Protocol stated on article 3.3 
that ‘emissions by sources and removals by sinks resulting from direct human-induced land-
use change and forestry activities’ are to be ‘measured as verifiable changes in carbon stocks’ 
and then generate negotiable credits of carbon. Old growth forests may have large stocks of 
carbon sequestered compared to young growth forest. Estimates range from 1 to 9 tons of 
carbon sequestered per hectare of forest. Depending on the land use change from 
deforestation a carbon net release can be also significant for calculations. Bearing in mind that 
this conservation initiative is more related to standing forest, carbon sequestration will not be 
a part of this study’s benefit calculations. It is noteworthy to mention that in the relation 
between carbon sequestration and biodiversity, there is both a direct and indirect effect from 
the first in the later, Díaz et al., (2009) indicates that different components of biodiversity 
have the potential to modify the earnings, magnitude, and long-term permanence of the 
terrestrial biosphere’s carbon stocks and fluxes.  
 
In order to assess a monetary value for carbon the Kyoto Protocol made it possible, 
through its flexible mechanisms, to create a carbon market. A voluntary carbon market was 
also created as an alternative to Kyoto regulated carbon market. The two initiatives differ in 
the costs associated with project implementation and carbon offset prices. Less regulation in 
carbon market makes the process simpler and thus reduces transactions costs. The price level 
can be an advantage in the regulated market, as it is much higher. The main impediment is 
related to which kind of project is suitable for each market. The Kyoto Protocol does not yet 
include the avoided deforestation scheme which is the reason why voluntary market prices 
were taken into account. The Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) is part of the voluntary 
market. It operates in the North America cap and trade system. All CCX emitting members 
make a voluntarily but legally binding commitment to meet GHG reductions trough projects 
that must undergo a third party verification (CCX, 2010). The price range adopted in this 
study is based on CCX prices and it varies from US$ 2.32 to US$ 5.5 ton of CO2  
 
4.3 Cost of Environmental Service Provision  
 
PES efficiency is not only determined by the extent to which incremental ES are 
provided but also by the cost at which this was achieved. These costs include: (1) opportunity 
costs of the benefits foregone from alternative activities; (2) when land use changes are 
required, the implementation costs of making and maintaining those changes; and (3) the 
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transaction costs of the program (Wunder et al., 2008). Here we assume that costs (2) and (3) 
are zero. According to Pearce and Moran (1994) the opportunity cost approach is not a 
valuation technique but it can be a powerful approach to a form of judgmental valuation. The 
approach consists in estimating the benefits of the activity causing environmental 
deterioration in order to set a benchmark for what the environmental benefits would have to 
be for the development not to be worthwhile. One essential aspect of opportunity costs related 
to conservation is stressed by Fearnside (1995), according to whom the usual tendency of 
including opportunity cost only for one side of the comparison should be avoided. Not only 
the foregone profits but also the value of the ES that would be sacrificed should be 
considered.   
In PES schemes for forest conservation, the opportunity cost can be calculated by 
estimating the foregone profits of alternative uses of land. Two different studies present the 
opportunity cost of preserving forests in the Amazon region. Nepstad et al. (2007) use net 
return simulation of economic activities such as soya production, cattle ranching and timber 
extraction. In a complementary method Börner and Wunder (2008) calculate the opportunity 
cost using broader data including crops such as coffee beans and corn. However it is worth to 
observe that Börner and Wunder’s derivations of opportunities costs are based on the 
assumption of nil current returns from standing forests, as a result of that simplification 
profits from converted uses are identical to the conservation opportunity costs. All 
opportunities costs are expressed in table 4.  
 
Table 4. Opportunities Cost Results 
    
Börner and 
Wunder 1 
Börner and 
Wunder 2 
Börner and 
Wunder 3 Nepstad 
Total OC mill US$  143 143 123 257000 
Annual OC mill US$ 14.3 14.3 12.3 8566.67 
reduced forest loss ha 564849 564849 525094 330000000 
OC/ha of reduced forest 
loss US$/ha/year 25.31 25.31 23.42 25.95 
1) Max price (hypothetical price needed to buy out all deforestation) 
2) Permanent CCX price (value in 2006) 
3) Temporary CCX price (same as above but with a 39% discount rate) 
 
 
Both studies mentioned above are designed for a REDD scheme context. However most PES 
schemes are designed to compensate private land owners for conserving the forests, and there 
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are no legal barring for traditional populations residing on public land to receive monetary 
compensation for ES.  
 
4.4 Comparison of Estimated Costs and Benefits from forest conservation 
 
In this section comparisons for costs and benefits from forest conservation are 
presented, by analyzing the net value of the marginal product obtained from market goods and 
non-market goods. As a result of Amazon particularities it is observed that opportunity costs 
of agriculture and other land use are not high enough to represent a significant incentive for 
not preserving. In Börner and Wunder (2008) a comparison of opportunity costs was made 
between the Amazonas state and Mato Grosso state, one of Brazilian’s top agricultural 
frontier and the result was a total opportunity cost almost five times bigger than for the 
Amazonian state. Reasons for considerably low opportunity costs in the tropical forest can be 
explained by the remote location, far from consumer centers. In addition climate and soil 
conditions are not appropriate for soya beans and other crops. The main implication of such a 
low opportunity cost is the motivation for conservation actions. Benefits from the 
environmental service provision exceed the foregone profits (opportunity costs) of alternative 
land use, as we can see in Table 5. Total benefits are the sum obtained by biodiversity 
estimation and carbon content for both minimum and maximum values previously presented. 
The minimum estimated net value of the marginal product obtained from non-market goods is 
US$ 281.63 and the maximum is US$760.95.   
 
Table 5. Costs and Benefits 
    
Börner and 
Wunder 1 
Börner and 
Wunder 2 
Börner and 
Wunder 3 Nepstad 
Costs US$/ha/yr 25.31 25.31 23.42 25.95 
   min máx Min Máx min máx min máx 
Total 
Benefits US$/ha/yr 382.83 464.89 453.23 548.73 281.63 344.37 631.43 760.95 
 
It is evident that benefits exceed by far the opportunity costs for the families attended by the 
program. Due to the low level of their opportunity cost one can say there is no relevant 
argument against families’ compliance with the program, a situation which would certainly 
happen in a scenario where benefits are fully compensated. One reason for not fully 
compensated benefits relies on the fact that families have imperfect information about 
benefits of environmental services provided by them. 
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5. Bolsa Floresta  
 
This section presents a brief analysis on the economic context of Bolsa Floresta PES. 
The first part describes the payment system and financing sources and the second part the cost 
frame of the whole program, including direct and indirect benefits. The third part discusses 
the additionality of the program.  
 
5.1 Actual payment system  
 
The program was constructed with participative approach giving a significant role to the 
communities and governmental institutions in Amazonas after broad discussions between the 
actors (FAS, 1, 2010). After an informative workshop on a zero deforestation target with local 
residents at each CUs, a specific contract was made individually with each family. This 
contract is applicable for those who had been living in the area for at least two years. In the 
contract, the CU community dweller commits to not to deforest areas of primary forest. This 
does not have any impact on the remainder of land used for subsistence plantation. An intern 
committee was created in order to ensure that the program functions well. The committee is 
responsible for studies and diagnoses of potential beneficiary families from CUs; the 
establishment of targets and operational procedures for implementing the program; promotion 
of institutional interaction with different organizations participating in the program; follow-
ups, subsidies and valuation of program implementation (Ibid). The program has four 
components: 
• Forest Allowance Family (BFF): monthly payment of R$ 501
• Forest Allowance Association (BFA): direct payment to CUs dwellers’ association. It 
is equivalent to 10% of the sum of BF family paid in each CUs. The aim is to strength 
the organization and social control of the program.  
 (approx. US$ 28.6) to 
the mothers of families living inside the CUs who are willing to make a commitment 
to environmental preservation and sustainable development;  
• “BF” Income: annual average payment of R$ 4.000 (approx. US$ 2285.7) to each 
CUs, R$350 (approx. US$ 200) per year per family. This component is to support and 
foment sustainable production of forest products such as fish, oils, nuts, fruits, honey, 
etc.  
                                                          
1 Currency exchange rate R$1/US$1.75  
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• “BF” Social: annual average payment of R$ 4.000 (approx. US$ 2285.7) to each CUs, 
R$350 (approx.US$ 200) per year per family. To support local improvements in 
education, health, communication, transport and other basic features to build 
citizenship and social power. 
According to Sustainable Amazonas Foundation, until October 2009, there were 6325 
families representing a total of 28623 people benefitting from the Bolsa Floresta program in 
14 conservation units covering more than 10 millions hectares in total (FAS, 1, 2010). The 
program is financed partly by the Amazon Fund (held by the Brazilian Development Bank- 
BNDES), and partly by FAS and other revenues. The idea is to invest more than half of the 
resources (58%) in activities that will generate income through sustainable activities, the BF 
Income, 10% will be devoted for the strengthening of associations, BF Association, and 32% 
of the resources will be applied in aiding programs of monitoring, education, health, 
productive chains, management and scientific development (FAS, 2, 2010). Revenue from 
REDD will also contribute to program funding. So far there is only one REDD project 
approved and implemented, Juma REDD, the next one is in conception phase. It is expected 
that in the post-Kyoto commitment REDD projects will be officially regulated. Consequently 
more revenue from high-priced carbon credits can be obtained by the programme and increase 
directly the benefits for traditional populations.  
 
5.2 Bolsa Floresta Costs Frame 
 
In the annual report for 2009 the program shows costs and investments made for a one 
year period from June of 2009 (FAS,3,2010). Program annual costs considering all four 
components are: 
 
Table 6. Bolsa Floresta Costs  
  Family Income Social Association Total BF 
Total US$ 1,974,828.57 969,142.86 1,103,656.00 368,156.00 4,415,783.43 
Total US$ /family 312.23 153.22 174.49 58.21 698.15 
Total US$ per ha 0.20 0.10 0.11 0.04 0.44 
 
Annual payment for the BF Family component is US$ 312.22 for each family; here 
the direct monetary benefit of the program were considered. Indirect gains are represented by 
the remaining three components Income, Social and Association. Annual cost per family 
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including all four components would thus be US$ 698.15. Annual cost per hectare, 
considering total conservation area of 10 million hectares is US$ 0.44 based on the annual 
cost estimations above. 
 
5.3 Meeting the environmental target  
 
  Projection models based on satellite images and spatial data for the expansion of 
Brazilian deforestation indicate an increase of deforestation area in a business as usual 
scenario (see Appendix 1). In the absence of any environmental policy such as a subsidy 
scheme, deforestation activities would represent a great part of the conservation units attended 
by the PES program in the year of 2050. These projection models are a good instrument to 
prove the additionality of the program,. Wunder (2009) argues that in order to be useful in 
building the baseline scenario, deforestation projection models need to indicate where and 
when deforestation will possibly occur. To demonstrate effectiveness the methodologies have 
to be very precise regarding to spatial and temporal conditions. In the case of overestimation 
of deforestation rate there is a risk to the buyer that additionality is only partially observed 
and therefore the buyer would pay for an environmental service provision that cannot be 
effectively proved. The debate about additionality also includes two important counter 
arguments in the Amazon case: 1) the traditional population would have carried on with their 
ancestral practices anyway; 2) the Amazon region has shown a trend of decreasing rates of 
deforestation before the introduction of PES.  
The Amazon region and conservation units have experienced small increases in 
deforestation rates since 1997. Satellite monitoring by the National Institute of Spatial 
Research (INPE) shows the slow advance of deforestation rates (see Appendix 2) with a 
maximum percentage of 3% increase. This can be explained through the increase of 
conservation units areas, technological improvements in monitoring systems and 
implementation of compensation schemes. 
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6. Optimal design and actual payment - A comparison  
 
The main objective of this work is to discuss an optimal payment that compensates 
foregone profits and benefits of preserving the forest. Table 7 describes the range of estimated 
optimal payment based on the minimum and maximum amounts and benefits from 
biodiversity and carbon storage discussed in session 3.  
 
Table 7. Optimal Payment 
    
Börner and 
Wunder 1 
Börner and 
Wunder 2 
Börner and 
Wunder 3 Nepstad 
   min máx min Máx Min máx min máx 
US$/ha/year 357.52 439.58 427.92 523.42 258.21 320.95 605.48 735 
 
 
In PES schemes the payments are normally based in hectares, not number of people or 
per family. For example in Costa Rica one of the pioneer countries in PES schemes, forest 
conservation contracts now pay to private land owners $64 dollars per ha/yr for each year 
over a five year period (Steed, 2007). Costa Rica’s system of PES consists of voluntary 
incentive contracts targeted to small and medium parcels of privately owned forest land, up to 
a maximum of 300 ha. Through these contracts, the landowners commit to adopt specified 
forest management plans for five years. In exchange, they are compensated for the actual 
costs of protection and the foregone revenues from alternative land uses. The ES considered 
in this PES scheme have been enumerated in the Costa Rican 1996 Forestry Law 7575. These 
include: 1) carbon sequestration; 2) water protection; 3) biodiversity conservation; and 4) 
scenic beauty. (Bienábe and Hearne, 2006). 
Some issues have to be raised in order to make a fair comparison between optimal and 
current payments. The environmental target for conservation comprises 10 million hectares, 
however not all of it is available for agricultural purposes and consequently families have a 
constraint on the availability of land. Limited data about total area of land that can be used for 
agriculture imposes an obstacle to this comparison. For example, in the Rio Gregorio 
Conservation Unit, the average area available for agriculture, is 3671 hectares; each family 
would thus have access to produce on 31.38 hectares. To have a more realistic hectare based 
comparison this value of area per family is included in table 7, as part of the analysis. A more 
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fair distribution of the benefits would be hectare-based but in the case of the Conservation 
Units the possession of land per family is not well defined. Families have the right to inhabit 
and produce in the land but not the official possession. Assuming the average of 31.38 hectare 
mentioned above we would get to an average current benefit of US$ 9.95 ha/yr, still too far 
from a ideal scenario where the minimum optimum calculated is US$ 258.21ha/yr and the 
maximum optimum is US$735 ha/yr. Following the optimal estimations payment, each 
family, holder of 31.38 ha, would then receive an annual total payment range of US$ 8102.6 
to US$ 23,064.3. Additional comparison can be made regarding total benefits from the 
program, which considers not only the direct payment from the BFF (but indirect benefits 
from the other components of the program. In this case, each family’s total annual benefits 
sum up to US$ 698.15 (see table 8), a total benefit of 22.25 ha/year, considering same area 
from above.   
 
Table 8. Annual Benefits 
  
Direct 
Benefit 
Indirect 
Benefit Total 
US$ per 
family 312.23 385.92 698.15 
US$ per ha* 0.20 0.24 0.44 
US$ per ha ** 9.95 12.30 22.25 
           *Total Cost divided by the total conservation area 
                       **Cost per family divided by 31.38 ha average agricultural area available per 
 family 
 
 Although it may seem very unrealistic to the vast Amazon context the 
comparisons on a hectare basis are useful in order to illustrate the gap between the two forms 
of payments. It does not matter in which direction our discussion goes, the optimum payment 
will always exceed the actual payment. Although the optimum payment greatly exceeds the 
actual payment it is worth noticing the social impact of the direct payment to the traditional 
populations. The average income of those traditional populations barely exceeds the national 
minimum wage (approx. US$ 292) per month. Furthermore the benefit from the ES provision 
would represent to each family an extra income per year that exceeds their monthly income.  
So far the discussions has focused on the optimal level of payment that maximizes the 
society’s net welfare. Bond et al (2009) agrees that at the very minimum, payments need to 
meet the opportunity costs (plus transaction costs) that resource managers incur from 
changing their behaviour. Equally important to the size and duration of the payments are how 
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the price is determined, the frequency of payments, and to whom and in what form the 
payments are made (Ibid). As discussed in the theoretical section, a PES scheme makes 
economical sense if the compensation payment exceeds the opportunity costs. The minimum 
opportunity cost is US$23.42 and maximum is US$ 25.95 (table 4). The direct benefit 
received by families represents 42% of the minimum opportunity cost. However, if compared 
with the actual total payment level in the last row (table 8) a number which is very close to 
the opportunity cost range, 95% of the minimum value is achieved. Considering all 
assumptions made before total benefit (direct and indirect) received by families in the 
Amazon it can be concluded that the total benefits do not totally compensate the families’ 
foregone profits of alternative land use such as soya and cattle production. 
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7. Conclusion  
 
Assessing values for ES and comparing the benefits associated with conservation of 
natural areas with the benefits from conversion of land can provide useful information for 
setting priorities in a variety of contexts. Values of ES should be reflected in national decision 
making and policy planning. PES schemes should be built in ways that properly address 
social and environmental concerns. It is also important to ensure that the right people pay and 
that they pay the full cost of providing the ES. Cost-benefit analysis can be a powerful tool for 
policy changes, especially in developing countries and it can provide useful results to discuss 
feasibility of environmental policy. 
When dealing with market failure situations one will always faces a number of 
limitations such as data constrain and imperfect information. The main weakness of this study 
is related to data constrain, especially concerning non-market goods. As most of the data was 
collected from other studies the study ended up being more limited than initially expected. 
CVM methods, for the biodiversity case, are also often controversial and no good substitute 
method was found to built upon. An important issue, however, was to express the overall 
difference between an optimal scenario that maximizes the society‘s net welfare and the 
current situation of payments. The current payment scheme is better than a business as usual 
scenario but it is far from optimal. Opportunity costs of other land use are not completely 
compensated in the payment scheme. Nevertheless, more effort should be made from the 
buyers of ES towards introducing payments that reflect all value incorporated in what they are 
paying for. Adjustments from family-based to hectare-based could help to improve efficiency 
within the program. But it is understandable that this shift depends more on other issues such 
as a proper definition of land possession and land tenure agreements, than simple regulation.  
Admittedly the calculations were only possible after some simplifying assumptions 
concerning costs and production functions, which have a real impact in the numerical results. 
Regardless of the generalizations a clear trend can be observed – optimal payment exceed 
current payment. 
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APPENDIX 1. DEFORESTATION PROJECTION: BOLSA FLORESTA SCENARIO 
 
1) Projection for 2050: Areas previously deforested in the Coservation Units attended by the 
Bolsa Floresta Program 
 
                          Source:INPE_PRODES(2007) 
 
 
APPENDIX 2 : DEFORESTATION PROJECTION: BUSINESS AS USUAL 
SCENARIO 
Projection 2050: Deforestation foreseen in the Conservation Units attended by the Bolsa 
Floresta Program as per the scenario “’Business as Usual’” of  SIMAMAZONIA MODEL. 
 
                          Source: Soares-Filho et al.(2006); FAS(2008)  
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APPENDIX 3 : From Constanza et al 1997, assuming that the demand curve for ecosystem 
services looks more like Fig. 1b than Fig. 1a, and that therefore the area pbqc is a 
conservative underestimate of the area abc . 
 
 
 
 
